



"Bersedia pajongj sebelum hudjan."
(A Malay proverb, quoted by Soetardjo in defense 
of his petition. Roughly translated, it reads: 
Get your umbrella ready before the rain begins.)
With its moderate aim of political autonomy for the Netherlands 
Indies, the Soetardjo Petition of 1936 was the major test of the will­
ingness of Dutchmen and Indonesian nationalists to cooperate in imple­
menting fundamental political reforms in the 1930fs. The proposal was 
put forward in the hope that it would provide the common goal towards 
which both Indonesians and Europeans could work.1 Being a step on the 
way towards independence, autonomy might appeal to the nationalist 
movement. Since 1935, that movement had experienced a swing towards 
cooperation, a term which in the context of Indies politics meant par­
ticipation in representative councils created by the Dutch. By 1935, 
most non-cooperating parties had been rendered inactive by internments, 
repressive legislation and police activity, leaving only the Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia [Indonesian Islamic Union Party--PSII], a 
shadow of the old Sarekat Islam, to represent the non-cooperators. A 
new series of cooperating nationalist parties came into existence, the 
largest being Parindra [Pai t ..i Indonesia Raj a--Great Indonesia Party] 
(founded in 1935 from a fusion of Boedi Oetomo and Soetomo's Persatoean 
Bangsa Indonesia [Indonesian National Union]), followed by the leftist 
Gerindo [Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia--Indonesian People1s Movement] (1937), 
and two small Muslim parties, Salim1s Pergerakan Penjadar [Awakening 
Movement] (1936), and its rival, Partai Islam Indonesia [Indonesian 
Islamic Party--PII] founded in 1938 by Wiwoho and Dr. Soekiman. Since 
these parties aimed to work in the Volksraad (the central representa­
tive body), it might have been expected that they would support gradu­
alist political reforms such as the Soetardjo Petition requested. At 
the same time, autonomy was an ideal to which the Dutch had given lip 
service since the inception of the Ethical Policy.2 By linking autonomy
1. In this sentence, the term "European” is used in the contemporary Indies sense 
to cover both full-blood Europeans, and Eurasians who were legally Europeans and 
were accepted as Europeans in Indies society. Since the great majority of Euro­
peans in the Indies were Dutch citizens, they are also loosely referred to as 
Dutchmen.
2. The Ethical Policy had been officially launched in 1901 as a welfare plan, in 
opposition to the previous exploitative and laissez-faire attitude to the Indies. 
Dutch governments pledged themselves to raise the economic, social and intellec­
tual standard of the Indonesians. It was also generally acknowledged that Hol­
land was obliged to train Indonesians for self-government, although the time
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with the ideal of a Rijksraad (Imperial Council), Soetardjo hoped to 
win over adherents of the currently fashionable notions of rijkseen- 
heid, 3 Would the cooperating nationalists and the Dutch now be pre­
pared to support a proposal for a conference to discuss the means of 
implementing autonomy for the Indies?
Since 1931, the Indonesians had thirty representatives in the 
Volksraad, equal to the combined European and Foreign Asian contin­
gents. SoetardjoTs petition was the first attempt to utilize the in­
creased Indonesian numbers to effect political change through the coun­
cil. Although the petition1s first impact occurred in the Volksraad, 
what happened after the Volksraad vote was taken was as revealing as 
the debate and vote themselves. The initial coolness towards the peti­
tion amongst the Indonesian political public was followed by partial 
support, indicating that the nationalist parties were realizing that a 
cooperating tactic required gradualist political methods. In Holland, 
on the other hand, Soetardjo1s attempt at cooperation met with disdain: 
the Dutch showed no reciprocal signs of moving towards the national­
ists.
Interestingly enough, the petition was conceived not by any of 
the leaders of the cooperating parties but by Indonesians unconnected 
with the organized nationalist movement. Not only did the petition 
play an important role in clarifying the attitudes of Dutchmen and the 
nationalist political parties towards cooperation, but it also marked 
the beginning of a move towards a consciously nationalist stand by 
members of cooperating parties which were outside the organized inde­
pendence movement.
The Origins of the Petit ion
As presented to the Volksraad in 1936, the Soetardjo Petition re­
quested the government in Holland and the States - General to call a confer­
ence of representatives of the Indies and the Netherlands. These 
representatives, acting on a footing of equality, would frame a plan 
for granting autonomy to the Indies within the limits of article 1 of 
the constitution, such autonomy to be implemented by means of gradual 
reforms within ten years. Article 1 of the constitution was an innocu­
ous-looking sentence which merely stated that the Dutch realm consisted
scheme was never spelled out: "in the unforeseeable future" was the commonly-
used expression. By the 1930!s, other political ideas originating with more 
liberal-minded Dutchmen, had come to be associated with the Ethical Policy and 
had brought the policy into disrepute with the conservatives who then dominated 
the political scene. For instance, many Ethici supported "association," the con­
cept that Indonesians, b> working with Dutchmen, would and should adopt Western 
goals and values. Conservatives considered such notions dangerous; it was better 
that Indonesians keep to their own way of life.
3. Rijkseenheid, or imperial unity, had become a popular catchword in Dutch colonial 
thinking in the 1930fs. It was considered disloyal to speak of dismembering the 
Dutch realm by granting independence to the Indies. On the other hand, consider­
able flexibility was permissible in defining rijkseenheid: while those on the
right saw it as an excuse for indefinite Dutch control of the colonies, others 
thought autonomy for the Indies would actually strengthen rijkseenheid by recon­
ciling Indonesians to less binding ties with Holland.
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of the Kingdom in Europe, Surinam, Curasao and the Netherlands Indies. 
What this article implied was a legally debatable point, but the spon­
sors of the petition construed it as indicating that the four parts 
of the realm stood on an equal footing, subordinate only to the inter­
ests of the realm as a whole. To this request the proposers appended 
an explanatory statement appealing to the need for greater unity be­
tween Holland and the Indies. In their view, such unity could be 
achieved only if the Indonesians, who had recently been dissatisfied 
and indifferent, were inspired by a plan to establish a relationship 
which fulfilled their needs.
In August 1936 the signatories of the petition stated that accord­
ing to their view of the future political form of the Indies, the coun­
try would possess the full right of self-government except for matters 
which were of common concern to both parts of the realm, e.g., inter­
national relations. They suggested that when working out a plan, the 
conference might well adopt the idea of a Rijksraad to regulate these 
imperial issues.4 Although the petition was to prove a unique event 
in the history of the Indies, the proposers themselves were careful to 
emphasize its antecedents. In the pamphlet which they issued in 1937 
to publicize their petition,5 they pointed to similar proposals by 
nationalists in 1918 and the advocacy of autonomy for the Indies by 
the (short-lived) associationist Vrijzinnige Groep (Liberal Group) in 
the Volksraad in 1931.6 By 1937, too, the signatories were giving 
greater prominence to the idea of a Rijksraad, and to a new argument-- 
the external danger to the Indies arising from rumors that colonies 
might be reallocated to appease the Mhave-notM powers. Such rumors 
stemmed from the belief that when Germany and Japan signed the Anti- 
Comintern Pact in November 1936, they discussed the eventual division 
of the Indies between them. Speculation by certain English parliamen­
tarians on the possibility of making over some colonies--Sumatra was 
specifica1^v mentioned--to the fascist powers, added to disquiet in 
the Indies. In the view of the signatories of the Soetardjo Petition, 
the prospect of a reallocation made it more than ever necessary to 
ensure the loyalty of Indonesians by granting them more autonomy. As 
time went on, more and more arguments, sometimes mutually contradic­
tory, were collected in support of a proposal which was obviously in­
tended as a catchall. The beauty of the petition was that it could 
sustain so many hopes, because it was essentially a simple request for 
a conference to consider granting an autonomy of undefined content.
It is not surprising that such a proposal should have appeared at 
this particular juncture. The Depression years had seen the near­
disappearance of political debate, since the government suppressed the 
activities of the non-cooperating organizations and forced the Volks­
raad to concentrate its full attention on economic matters. In 1936, 
when the Governor-General announced in June that the economy was
4. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1936-37, Bijlagen, Memorie van Antwoord, 
August 1936, Onderwerp 26 - Stuk 5.
5. Indonesie Zelfstandig. Petitie Soetardjo. Door de onderteekenaars der petitie 
(Autonomous Indonesia. The Soetardjo Petition. By the signatories of the peti­
tion) (Batavia, 1937).
6. This group comprised Fournier (Dutch), Arifin (Arab), and Ratu Langie and Soejono 
(Indonesians). See Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1931-32, Vol. I, pp. 
187-188.
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recovering, one could expect a similar revival of political interest, 
especially since the Depression had revealed many shortcomings in the 
relationship between Holland and the Indies. Even the European par­
ties grew uneasy at the harshness of the Indies Governments retrench­
ment measures, which frequently seemed to subject the interests of the 
Indies to those of Holland. Finally, Indonesians were bound to be in­
fluenced by the momentous developments in India and the Philippines 
during the preceding years. In 1935 India received a constitution 
under which the provinces became self-governing, and in November 1935 
the self-governing Commonwealth of the Philippines was inaugurated, 
with the promise of independence in 1946. Little wonder that people 
in the Netherlands Indies were beginning to stir again after the polit­
ical stagnation of the Depression years. The Soetardjo Petition was 
merely the first, and the most important, of several new suggestions 
for the reform of relations between the Indies and Holland.
However, the particular circumstances surrounding the petition 
are rather unusual. One might have expected such a proposal to ema­
nate from the group of self-styled nationalists in the Volksraad-- the 
Nationale Fractie [National Fraction], led by Mohamad Hoesni Thamrin. 
This group had pledged itself to work towards the independence of the 
Indies by means of political reforms. Instead, the petition was signed 
by such relatively moderate men as Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, a patih 
[administrator directly under bupati] and the president of the Perhim- 
poenan Pegawai Bestuur Boemipoetra (Association of Native Civil Serv- 
ants--PPBB), Ratu Langie, a lone-wolf Christian representative of 
Persatoean Minahasa [Minahasa Union], Kasimo, the Javanese president 
of the Koempoelan Politiek Katoliek di Indonesia (Political Associa­
tion of Indonesian Catholics--PPKI), Datoek Toemenggoeng, a Minangka- 
bau aristocrat and secretary of the PPBB, and two representatives of 
racial minority groups, Ko Kwat Tiong and Alatas, Chinese and Arab 
respectively. Not a Nationale Fractie member among them, although 
Ratu Langie was so close to Thamrin*s group that many Dutchmen con­
sidered him as dangerous as an organized nationalist. Moreover, these 
people had not sought the cooperation or advice of the nationalist 
movement, which in fact greeted the petition with disdain.
Because the origins of the petition puzzled Dutchmen and Indone­
sians alike, we should look more closely at what is known about its 
composition. Soetardjo himself has given a rather ingenuous account 
of the inspiration which led him to write the petition.7 The larger 
events leading up to it are recalled convincingly enough, and at the 
time of its presentation he stressed them too: He was alarmed by the
repressive government measures which followed the mutiny of De Zeven 
Provinoien in 1933.8 In particular, he objected to the arrests of
7. The following is based on a copy of an extract from his unpublished memoirs 
given to me by Soetardjo.
8. The crew of De Zeven Pro' : cien, a ship in the Dutch Navy, mutinied off the coast 
of Sumatra in January 1933 in protest against the third salary reduction in two 
years— part of Colijn's retrenchment measures. After fourteen days at sea, the 
mutiny was brought to an end when the ship’s pursuers (accidentally) hit it with 
a bomb. In the Indies many Europeans held the Indonesian crew members responsi­
ble for the mutiny, although Dutchmen were also involved. But most alarming of 
all in the eyes of contemporary Dutchmen was the fact that the mutiny appeared
to have been activated by members of a communist cell on board the ship. Com­
bined with previous evidence^of Dutch communist and socialist revolutionary
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leftist leaders and the governments attempt to weaken the powers of 
the principalities (Surakarta and Jogjakarta), regions which were close 
to Soetardjo!s heart. "In this situation," he writes, "I sought a way 
whereby I with the support of the Pamong Pradja (Indonesian civil serv­
ice) could help my nation." In dramatic fashion he then recounts how 
he "suddenly realized" that a civil servant would receive public sup­
port so long as his action was based on the law. At that moment he 
felt guided to reach down a volume of collected laws, which he opened 
at the Dutch Constitution. His eyes fell on the first article of the 
constitution, which he immediately interpreted in the manner explained 
above. Since he knew that his interpretation was inconsistent with 
articles 62 and 63, according to which the colonies were subordinate 
to Holland, he concluded that this discrepancy must be corrected if 
the realm were not to disintegrate. According to his memoirs, Soetar- 
djo thereupon wrote the petition and showed it to Ratu Langie, who, 
being suitably impressed, immediately signed it, as did the others at 
a later stage.
The historian cannot, however, rest satisfied with this highly 
individualistic account. For one thing, it denies the existence of 
external intellectual inspirations. The idea that article 1 of the 
constitution justified equality for the components of the realm was 
not a new one, but had been propounded by several Ethical-minded Dutch 
legal experts. Soetardjo admits as much in his 1937 pamphlet, when he 
states: "As far as the constitutional interpretation is concerned, we
can appeal to that of Kleintjes, Eigeman, Van Vollenhoven, Struyken 
and Kranenburg, and moreover to the opinion of the Oppenheim Commis­
sion."9 Furthermore, his account leaves several questions unanswered. 
First of all, what led this particular group of people to assume the 
responsibility of proposing the petition? From Soetardjo*s life and 
activities we can infer various motives. He was a dedicated civil 
servant, supremely aware of the importance and responsibility of his 
vocation. He edited the journal of the PPBB, Pemimpin (Leader), in 
which he constantly expounded his philosophy concerning the role of 
the prijaji (officialdom) which he envisaged as a noble one, analogous 
to that of the samurai in Japan--an able governing group helping the 
country to advance.10 In his attempt to help his fellow civil servants 
live up to this ideal, he urged them to devote themselves selflessly 
to their task (he often inveighed against promotion-seekers), and took 
practical measures such as campaigning for a Civil Service Academy to 
produce better-trained prijaji--and the government finally did estab­
lish such a school in 1938. Soetardjo considered that although the 
role of the PPBB in representative councils was rightly limited by its 
constitution to issues concerning administration, prijaji delegates 
should face up to other problems. . In Pemimpin of March 1938 he ex­
tendencies, the mutiny made Dutchmen increasingly nervous of leftists. The re­
sult was a purge of communists and suspected communist front members in the 
armed services, and repression of leftists generally in the Indies. (See L. de 
Jonge, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. I 
[The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969], pp. 173-179.) Interestingly, Soetardjo in 
fact spoke in support of the 1935 bill to restrict freedom of association and 
assembly. Little wonder that both Dutchmen and Indonesians mistrusted his con­
tradictory actions.
9. Indonesie Zelfstandig, p. 8.
10. Pemimpin, February 1937.
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plained to his fellow civil servants why he embarked on political ac­
tion by proposing his petition. He said he was much concerned at the 
excessively backward condition of the common people, to whom he felt a 
responsibility because he had been elected by them via the members of 
regency councils. Significantly, he felt that at that time no other 
person more capable than himself was prepared to take steps to improve 
the condition of the people, since the nationalist movement had come 
to a standstill. As an Indonesian civil servant, he felt he had to 
act as a bridge across the increasing gap between the government and 
the people. These last two points were reiterated in speeches he made 
in support of his petition before the Volksraad and at public meetings. 
In effect, Soetardjo regarded himself as a national leader. In his 
view, the prijaji were rightful leaders of the people, since they had 
closest contact with the masses in day to day life and exercised con­
stant leadership over them.11
Soetardjo emerged as a nationalist only gradually. Probably his 
dissatisfaction with the political situation stemmed originally from 
his deep resentment at the inferiority of the prijaji!s position vis- 
a-vis that of the European civil service. The first sign of this 
sentiment was his pamphlet, Gvleven van den Inlandschen Bestuuvsambte- 
naar (Grievances of the Native Civil Servant), published in 1919,12 
which complained that Indonesian civil servants were badly treated, 
were frequently reproved in public by the Dutch, and had no right of 
initiative, of intellectual development or of expression of opinion.
His campaign to raise the status and morale of the pamong pradja was 
later seen in such matters as his sponsorship of Volksraad motions 
urging the government to appoint more Indonesians to higher administra­
tive posts. And in an article in Pemimpin of May 1938, revealingly 
entitled, ’’The Slave makes the Tyrant,” Soetardjo exhorted civil serv­
ants to support the movement for his petition. Although they must 
behave like civil servants, he argued: ”We must never forget we are
sons of this country, and that we are free citizens like other inhabi­
tants.” Meyer Ranneft described Soetardjo as consumed by bitterness 
and envy, longing above all for equality with the Dutch.13 Soetardjo 
indeed desired deeply, as did most of the Indonesian intelligentsia, 
to be respected by prominent Dutchmen. He valued their regard and
11. Soetardjo has described his part in determining the role of the civil service
in the first days of the Indonesian Republic in 1945. (This account, in a type­
script note given to me, no doubt also forms part of his memoirs.) In a top- 
level discussion with Hatta and Sukarno at that time, he offered to ensure the 
loyalty of the pamong pradja to the Republic if the leaders of the political 
movement would recognize the pamong pradja as leaders of the people (pemimpin 
rakjat)--which, according to him, they did.
Benedict Anderson gives a rather different account of relations between 
nationalist leaders and the pamong pradja at this time. (Java in a Time of 
Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 [Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1972], pp. 113-114.) Sukarno was apparently willing to give Soetardjo 
and other civil service leaders important positions in return for their loyalty, 
while attempting to by-pass the pamong pradja in order to unite the people as a 
whole with its national leadership.
12. Soetardjo, Grieven van de Inlandschen Bestuursambtenaar (Weltevreden: Indone-
sische Drukkerij, 1919).
13. Manuscript notes, ”Mensen die ik heb gekend. 1930/1931” ("People I have known. 
1930/1931”), Meyer Ranneft ^Collection 979, General State Archives, The Hague.
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sought it almost ingratiatingly at times. ll+ When he felt rejected he 
could react bitterly. He was by turns cautious and bold, confusing 
Indonesians and Dutchmen alike. This variation in approach was mir­
rored in his petition and in his presentation of it, at one moment 
warmly praising Dutch rule and at the next denouncing it; while his 
sincerity in the latter activity was obvious, in the former it was 
uncertain. But there is no doubt that in the 1930’s he became in­
creasingly disillusioned with the Dutch and increasingly bitter in his 
attacks on them.14 5 By 1936 he saw the solution in political autonomy 
for the Indies. Perhaps, too, he felt in a stronger position to re­
veal his nationalist aims in 1936 because in that year he assumed 
leadership of the PPBB from the more conservative regent, Wiranata 
Koesoema.
Is it right to see Soetardjo as a rival to the organized nation­
alists? Some of the latter certainly did. A writer in the Parindrist 
daily Tempo argued that the motive behind the Soetardjo Petition was 
that if the Indies became independent, Soetardjo would become ”radja,” 
or at least that Soetardjo wished to ensure Mthat he is not forestalled 
by the champions of the present nationalist movement, who may also wish 
to become president of Indonesia!” 16 Soetardjo himself never attacked 
the organized nationalists as they did him, but the fact that he did 
not consult them before introducing his petition perhaps indicates a 
certain distrust of them. This may, however, more properly be inter­
preted as a realization by Soetardjo that his methods differed from 
those of the organized nationalists. He never intended to seek mass 
support for the petition;17 his attention was concentrated on getting 
it through the Volksraad. He described his petition as the Mlowest 
common denominator” of opinions in the Indies community;18 apparently
14. De Jonge relates an interesting tale in this connection. On his departure from 
the Indies, Governor-General de Jonge received an unexpected visit from Soetar­
djo, Prawoto and Datoek Toemenggoeng, described in his Herinneringen (Groningen: 
Wolters-Noordhoff, 1968), pp. 387-388. According to de Jonge, Soetardjo deliv­
ered a speech of gratitude to him, saying that although they had not always 
agreed with his measures, they had always known where they were with him, and 
that made it easy for them to esteem the many good things he had done. De Jonge 
was touched, and proceeded to read them a fatherly lesson against overestimating 
their capacities; did Soetardjo really think he could be compared with the great 
Dutch officials like De Kat Angelino and Hart? He noted that they listened at­
tentively and bowed deeply over the hand he extended to them. This story could 
be interpreted in a number of ways, but it seems unlikely that Soetardjo, having 
quite gratuitously made a friendly overture to De Jonge, would find a satisfac­
tory response in such a patronizing .dressing-down. It also seems to be charac­
teristic of Soetardjo*s approach that he did not like to argue directly with his 
superiors, a fact that made them suspicious when they later heard that this ap­
parently meek and polite man was criticizing their policies behind their backs.
15. That Soetardjo did feel persecuted by the Indies Government is clear from his 
memories of interrogations and threats of exile or administrative discipline 
from his superiors, recprded in a short biography of Soetardjo presented as a 
preface of his Dasar Essentieel Pendidikan Tjalon Sardjana Pantjasila (Djakarta: 
Balai Pustaka, 1969), p. 13.
16. Tempo, March 23, 1938.
17. Interviews with the author, November, 1970.
18. Nationale Commentaren, March 12, 1938, p. 153.
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he had carefully calculated that a moderate, rather vaguely-worded pro­
posal like his had the best hope of being carried. Publicly he ex­
plained that he knew that a proposal aimed at winning the support of 
the Indonesian nationalist movement would have had to include much 
more sweeping demands.19
What about the motives of the other signatories of the petition? 
Being another prominent Indonesian civil servant, Datoek Toemenggoeng's 
sentiments may have been similar to those of Soetardjo. It has already 
been mentioned that Ratu Langie was regarded as a nationalist hardly 
distinguishable from those of the organized movement. Like Soetardjo, 
he had become more and more nationalistic over the years. Being a 
Protestant from the Minahasa, he shared that area's strong regionalism 
and had held aloof from the nationalist movement, refusing to join the 
PPPKI in 1928.20 However, he often attacked Dutch rule in closely- 
reasoned speeches in the Volksraad, concentrating particularly on the 
iniquities of economic exploitation. With his extensive academic back­
ground and his great awareness of the importance of international de­
velopments for the Indies,21 he was considered by many Dutchmen as one 
of the most dangerous of the Volksraad nationalists. The authorities 
were no doubt glad to seize the opportunity of expelling him from the 
Volksraad in 1937 for entering faulty travel declarations, a fairly 
common activity among Volksraad members.22 This event only helped to 
radicalize him further. In 1938 he founded and edited a Dutch-language 
weekly, Rationale Commentaren, which became famous for its nationalist 
disposition, and in 1939 he steered his small Minahasan party into 
Gapi (Gaboengan Politik Indonesia--Indonesian Political Federation-- 
formed in 1939), thus finally reconciling himself to the organized 
nationalist movement.
Ratu Langie, Kasimo, Ko Kwat Tiong and Alatas, all being represen­
tatives of minority groups, may have felt the need to support a pro­
gram for autonomy in preference to full independence on terms unfavor­
able to their groups. The parties of all these men showed in the 
1930's an increasing tendency to move towards the organized national­
ists, culminating in the joining of the nationalist federation Gapi by
19. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, July 29, 1936, p. 568.
20. The Indonesian political federation, Persatoean Perhimpoenan2 Politik Kebangsaan 
Indonesia, created in 1928, proved still-born, since its member parties failed 
to work together for any common objective.
21. Ratu Langie had delivered a speech in the Volksraad on the influence of develop­
ments in the Pacific as early as 1928. In the 1930's he was involved in writing 
two books on the subject: Indonesia in den Pacific (Sukabumi: Soekaboemische
Snelpersdrukkerij, 1937), and in conjunction with Soetardjo and Thamrin, De 
Pacific (no publisher or place of publication given, 1938).
22. Ratu Langie was convicted for defrauding the state of f.200 by means of false 
travel documents (Pertja Selatan, April 22, 1937). In 1939 the Attorney-General 
reported to the Governor-General that investigation had shown that over the 
period 1936-1939, sixteen Volksraad members had given false information concern­
ing travel and accommodation costs. Five of these had thus defrauded the state 
of amounts ranging from f.234 to f.1003. Interestingly, he recommended prosecu­
tion only of the two biggest offenders. (Letter from Attorney-General to Gov­
ernor-General, June 2, 1939, No. 2087/A.P., in State Archives [The Hague], 
Mailrapport No. 591/39 [secret].)
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the PPKI, Persatoean Minahasa and Partai Arab Indonesia [Indonesian 
Arab Party--PAI]. Ko Kwat Tiong's party, Partai Tionghoa Indonesia 
(Chinese Indonesian Party), applied to become a member of Gapi, but 
was accepted only as an associate. The official goal of the PPKI was 
merely progress for the Indies, but the party came to look upon inde­
pendence with favor.23 24 It is perhaps fair to say that the signatories 
of the Soetardjo Petition took the old Ethical Policy spirit more seri­
ously than did the organized nationalists, partly because they stood 
to gain more from it. Shades of the Ethical Policy are discernible in 
the pamphlet which they produced in support of their petition: it
brought into play quotations from De Kat Angelino (the advocate of 
"synthesis") and Kipling (East and West can meet) against both extremes 
of its opponents. Ratu Langie had only recently been a member of the 
Vrijzinnige Groep, which espoused a program that read like a manifesto 
of the Ethici.21* Kasimo, Ko Kwat Tiong and Alatas were likewise adher­
ents of "integration." It was perhaps because the organized national­
ists recognized this group of signatories as latter-day Ethici that 
they often despised them: association parties had long since been re­
jected by the nationalist movement. Certainly Soetardjo was frequently 
castigated as naive, the word most often used to deride the idealistic 
Ethici.
Soetardjo and his fellow signatories saw their role as rather 
different from that of the organized nationalist. In their pamphlet 
they argued that nationalism
. . .  is not limited to the group who are now commonly described as 
nationalists, and who to judge from the formulation of their spokes­
men in the Volksraad want the complete political independence of 
Indonesia. But next to this group of intellectuals stands another 
group, that of the ’’moderate nationalists,” who limit their politi­
cal ideals within the framework of political cohesion with Holland:
Indonesia an autonomous part of the realm and endowed with equal 
rights.25
Because both these groups worked in representative institutions--the 
litmus test for cooperation in the Indies--it seems that both can be 
called cooperating nationalists. It so happened that, as the quotation 
reveals, the organized nationalist movement of the time consisted main­
ly of radical nationalists, cooperating and otherwise, who would accept 
nothing short of independence. Moderate nationalists belonged also to 
organizations which lacked strictly nationalist objectives. The Soe­
tardjo Petition, for instance, did not emanate from the PPBB; in spon­
soring it, Soetardjo was acting in a personal capacity. As an organi­
zation, the PPBB did not express an opinion on the petition. However, 
this very emergence of nationalism in groups from which the Dutch tra­
ditionally expected loyalty was perhaps more likely to alarm the 
authorities into considering placatory measures.
23. The gradual move towards nationalism by the PPKI is reflected in its history 
before 1936. Originally founded in 1925 as Pakempalan‘Politiek Katholiek Djawi 
(Political Organization of Javanese Catholics), it soon adopted the name Per- 
koempoelan Politiek Katholiek di Indonesia, and attended the second PPPKI Con­
gress of December 1929 as well as the Indonesia Raja Congress of January 1932.
24. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1931-32, Vol. I, July 13, 1931, pp. 187- 
188.
25. Indonesie Zelfstandig, p. 9.
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The Petition in the Volksraad
The Volksraad debates on the Soetardjo Petition offer a rare in­
stance of Indonesians and Europeans discussing the possibility and 
form of an autonomous Indies. The variety of tones in this discussion 
is striking, even within the one speech. Soetardjo’s defense of his 
proposal,26 for instance, was in general strongly worded, but it con­
tained also some appeals to the Europeans. His first two points dealt 
with the lack of trust in the community towards the government. Moder­
ate and loyal native groups, he claimed, had found that government 
suppression of the extreme Left threatened themselves as well. Worse 
than this, the retrenchment measures of the Depression and lack of 
consideration for Indonesian wishes in filling leading official posi­
tions, had embittered the native civil service. His final reasoning 
was connected with external affairs. The Indies, he warned, could not 
be uninfluenced by the turbulence in the Pacific region. He pointed 
also to the colonial hunger of other countries, and warned that Holland 
should not rely on the protection of ’’certain great powers” (notably 
Britain). The Dutch colonial position could be weakened or strength­
ened by one factor--the wishes of her colonized peoples. He then out­
lined the steps which he considered necessary for the formation of an 
autonomous Indonesia. These included the implementation of administra­
tive reform in the Outer Islands so as to give those regions democratic 
autonomous group communities; the abolition of dualism in the civil 
service; the transformation of the Volksraad into a fully-fledged par­
liament, with departmental directors responsible to it; the establish­
ment of a Rijksraad, consisting of representatives from both Holland 
and the Indies; and citizenship of the Indies for those who by birth, 
descent or future orientation belonged to that country.
This speech contained carefully worded appeals to all groups in 
the Volksraad. Soetardjo believed that his petition, based as it was 
on the search for an autonomous Indonesia, ”should be acceptable to 
moderate and loyal groups, from Parindra to the regents1 corps.” At 
the same time he reassured the Europeans that ”in our group there is 
no place for action which breaks the political bond between both parts 
of the realm. . . . This bond, which is really already centuries old, 
shall, if it is altered so as to conform with the ’ethical calling’ 
adopted by the Dutch people, bring much profit, in our honest convic­
tion, not only to Holland but also to the Indies, and make both coun­
tries great.” He found the problem of the position of the Dutch in an 
autonomous Indonesia a delicate one, and could only say: ”It is self-
evident that the Dutch will occupy a position of honor in our midst. 
This does not in the least detract from the requirement that in in­
creasing measure Indonesia will be responsible for carrying out the 
affairs of this country.” He concluded with a plea to the Europeans 
for support, reminding them of the friendly feeling which had recently 
arisen between the white and brown members of the Volksraad, for which 
he particularly thanked (as it were in hopeful anticipation) the lead­
ers of the Eurasian Indo-Europeesch Verbond [Indo-European League-- 
IEV], the right-wing Vaderlandsche Club [Fatherland Club] and the 
associationist Politiek-Economischen Bond [Political Economic League-- 
PEB] .
26. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, July 9, 1936, pp. 74-83, 
and July 29, 1936, pp. 566-568.
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The petition was able to pass through the Volksraad largely be­
cause it won the votes of the biggest European party, the IEV, which 
held eight of the twenty-five European seats. The IEV was troubled by 
the declining position of Eurasians during the Depression years, and 
disappointed to find that the government ignored its complaints. At 
the same time as Soetardjo launched his petition, the IEV began an 
open attack on government policy towards Eurasians. Its leader, De 
Hoog, denounced the government in a very bitter speech in the Volksraad 
on July 30, 1936, and was supported by a flood of approving letters 
from IEV branches.27 In the same year, moreover, there were signs 
that the IEV was increasingly concerned at Holland's dominance of the 
Indies' economy.28 29 Carried on the tide of their mounting opposition 
to the government and their desire for greater independence from Hol­
land, the IEV was prepared to support the petition because it requested 
a conference and because it suggested the establishment of a Rijks- 
raad.2 9
Obviously Soetardjo could not hope to placate all the Europeans 
in the Volksraad. The Christelijk Staatkundige Partij (Christian Con­
stitutionalist Party--CSP) and the Vaderlandsche Club were openly hos­
tile from the outset. Verboom, the Vaderlandsche Club's president, 
interpreted Soetardjo's speech as a threat to the Europeans.30 C. C. 
van Helsdingen of the CSP completely rejected the idea of considering 
autonomy for the Indies within ten years, since in his view the coun­
try was not ready for it. His suspicion of "Native intellectuals" was 
made clear by the aspersions he cast upon them; in his view they were 
not suited to taking over from the Dutch the task of governing the 
Indies, because he doubted whether they had the "mentality which is 
necessary confidently to expect from them objective judgments about-- 
to name just a few matters--the interests of capital at home and 
abroad, the interests of minorities and different racial groups, and 
also the interests of the masses." He enquired: "Have the ethical
norms of honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, etc., taken such deep 
root that they are in a position to neutralize and negate the ever- 
recurring public nepotism and what goes with it?" These virtues, he 
hinted, could only be found in Christian nations. However, he was 
sufficiently infected by the prevailing dissatisfaction with the state 
of relations between Holland and the Indies to suggest, instead of a 
conference, a commission in the Dutch Lower House on colonial affairs.31 
This proposal was supported by other Europeans, including Roep (PEB) 
and Kerstens of the Indische Katholieke Partij [Indies Catholic Party]. 
None of the Europeans approved Soetardjo's plea for autonomy within 
ten years. When finally Soetardjo amended the petition to omit the 
ten-year term,32 he won the support of the five-man PEB and thus
27. See the IEV Blauwboek (Batavia: Ruygrok § Co., 1936).
28. See P. W. J. van der Veur, "Introduction to a Socio-Political Study of the Eura­
sians of Indonesia" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1955), pp. 265-268.
29. See De Hoog's speech, Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, 
September 18, 1936, pp. 1544-45.
30. Ibid., Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, September 28, 1936, pp. 1680-81.
31. Ibid., Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, September 17, 1936, pp. 1515-17.
32. Ibid., Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, September 28, 1936, p. 1666.
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ensured a majority vote for his proposal, since 8 Europeans voted with 
18 Indonesians and Foreign Asians to give a 26/20 vote on the issue.33
The support of Indonesians in the Volksraad was not as easy to win 
as might have been expected. In the event, six of them voted against 
the petition. Two of these members, Notosoetarso and Sosrohadikoesoemo, 
were known to be conservatives who invariably voted with the govern­
ment. The other four, however, were members of the Nationale Fractie, 
which had split over the petition for tactical reasons. Six members 
of this group, led by Thamrin, reluctantly voted for the petition on 
the grounds that it sought to hold a conference which could lead to 
autonomy.31* The other four pronounced that a movement for autonomy 
was useless unless it had support outside the Volksraad. Soeroso also 
disliked the vagueness of the petitions wording, and feared that any 
autonomy granted by means of the conference would maintain the domi­
nance of the Europt-.m element in government, thus rendering the peti­
tion futile to Indonesians.35 It is possible, too, that personal dis­
like entered into Soeroso1s opposition. He had several times made 
attacks on Soetardjo and on Indonesian civil servants in general, whom 
he regarded as sycophants of the rulers. Wirjopranoto, who, like 
Thamrin and Soeroso, was a representative of Parindra in the Nationale 
Fractie, considered the petition objectionable because it would weaken 
the ideology of the nationalist movement, since its aim fell short of 
independence.36 Wiwoho, who had been appointed to represent Indonesian 
Muslims and who later led the Partai Islam Indonesia, complained that 
the petition contained no guarantee that the proposed conference would 
result in autonomy.37 In short, these members of the Nationale Fractie 
were still strongly under the non-cooperating influence. They were 
not prepared to abandon their independent, radical standpoint by 
appearing to support a gesture which seemed unlikely to succeed to the 
degree they wanted, might weaken the nationalist will if it gained 
minor concessions but no real autonomy, would render them vulnerable 
to the charge of being little more than Ethici at heart . . . and
would entail recognition of the leadership and initiative of a rela­
tively conservative civil servant. As will be seen, in taking this 
attitude, the Nationale Fractie members who opposed the petition re­
flected the initial reaction of nationalist parties and press outside 
the Volksraad.
It was thus amidst widespread dissatisfaction with the proposal 
itself that the Soetardjo Petition was accepted by the Volksraad. 
Everyone objected to its vagueness, which left open to doubt what, if 
anything, would be decided by the conference it requested. However, 
as Soetardjo had probably calculated, it was this very vagueness which 
brought the petition support, since given a wish for more autonomy, 
one could hope that the conference might further one’s own specific 
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proposal of such wide-reaching political significance been passed by 
the Volksraad. It had moreover proved a catalyst among the European 
members, since it provoked an unusual display of approval for the idea 
of a commission on colonial relations, indicative of the general dis­
content on this topic. There had also been a degree of consensus among 
Volksraad members in support of the concept of a Rijksraad.
A surprising aspect of the whole debate, however, was its rela­
tively subdued nature, as though everyone knew in advance that the 
petition had no hope of success; even if the Volksraad passed it, it 
would be rejected by the government in Holland. The lack of interest 
in the petition is revealed by the failure of a quarter of the Volks­
raad to vote on the issue.38 An Indonesian paper alleged that they 
had preferred to attend an (unspecified) Provincial Council meeting.
It also commented that the Indies government's announcement of the 
devaluation of the guilder, in September 1936, deflected attention 
from the contemporaneous debate on the petition.39 Outside the Volks­
raad, press and public evinced little interest and less approval for 
the petition, which seemed to gain the blessing of the legislature 
almost by mistake.
Indonesian Responses Outside the Volksraad
Strangely enough, it was not until Soetardjo's petition had been 
passed by the Volksraad that it aroused public interest. While at 
first both Indonesian and Dutch papers, with important exceptions, had 
taken a decidedly cool attitude towards the petition, many Indonesian 
newspapers now began to praise it. True, leftist papers like Keba- 
ngoenan continued to throw cold water on the whole idea, proclaiming 
that the petition had no hope of success. But the proposal had a 
strong champion in Mohammad Tabrani, the editor of Pemandangan, who 
greeted it with enthusiasm, and from its first appearance urged that 
a mass movement be organized to interest the masses in the petition.40 
He publicized this idea with renewed vigor after the Volksraad1s adop­
tion of the proposal, and on October 5, 1936 suggested that all parties 
participate in a body which would work out a five-year plan for the 
implementation of autonomy according to the Soetardjo Petition. In 
February 1937 he again urged that an independent committee be estab­
lished to propagandize the petition in order to influence the decision 
of the government in Holland.41 The year 1937 was to prove an impor­
tant year for those who had hopes of a change in Dutch policy towards 
the Indies, since in that year the Lower House elections took place, 
to be followed by the formation o f  a new cabinet.
Tabrani's campaign bore fruit in March 1937, when a Soetardjo 
Petition Committee was established. It included Drs. Soebroto of 
Parindra and Sardjan of Penjadar, but none of the signatories of the
38. Eight of the non-voters were Indonesians, 4 European aiid 3 Chinese.
39. Soeara Oemoem, October 3, 1936.
40. July 11, 1936, summarized in Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche 
Pers (IPO) (Weltevreden: Bureau voor de Volkslectuur, 1936), p. 458.
41. Pemandangan, February 8, 1937, summarized in IPO 1937, pp. 110-111.
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p e t i t i o n . S o e t a r d j o  wrote later that the committee had asked him to 
lead it, but he had refused, since he considered that this responsibil 
ity was better carried out by leaders of the nationalist movement.1*3 
This indicates that the proposers of the petition saw their role as 
limited to work in the Volksraad, where they continued to speak in de­
fense of their proposal while the decision in Holland was still pend­
ing. Consideration of the petition proceeded at a very slow pace at 
the upper level. It was discussed briefly in the States-General in 
the first half of 1937, in connection with the Indies budget, but a 
final decision was postponed until the Governor-General’s advice on 
the matter reached the Minister. A decision was not handed down until 
November 1938, more than two years after the vote in the Volksraad. 
There was thus plenty of time to put pressure on the authorities, and 
that such pressure was needed was clear from the negative tone of the 
remarks made both by members of the States-General and by the Minister 
for Colonies, Colijn, in early 1937.
In his speech in the Volksraad in July 1937, Soetardjo appeared 
depressed by these remarks, commenting: ". . . It is my firm convic­
tion that if the line announced by Minister Colijn is followed, in 
another three hundred years we will still not be considered ripe for 
the autonomy we request.f,1+ 4 However, he pressed ahead with his re­
quest, now proposing two five-year plans to prepare the Indies for 
autonomy. In August he spoke again in a fighting mood, but still pre­
serving his restricted role as a moderate, nationalist civil servant:
If our petition is rejected by Hoiland--which I certainly hope it 
will not be--then this will prove that in this fake parliament there 
is no room for constructive political work of the more fundamental 
kind. The future of this country must then be fought out further 
outside this hall by those of our compatriots who consider themselves 
called to it, i.e., by the professional politicians, of whom Thamrin 
is the first representative in this hall. I or my group, as standing 
outside that political movement, cannot take part in it.42 35
Only a few months afterwards, however, Soetardjo decided in fact 
to participate in a public movement in support of his petition. In 
October 1937, the Central Soetardjo Petition Committee was established 
its president being Soetardjo himself. The rest of the committee con­
sisted of the other signatories of the petition, and other prominent 
Indonesians, like Hadji Agoes Salim, Atik Soeardi and Iskandar Dinata 
of the Sundanese regionalist party, Pasoendan, and Hendromartono, the 
trade union leader.1*6 Sartono, previously president of the non-cooper 
ating Partindo and now an independent Bandung city council member, 
became its vice-president. To have won the support of such an influ­
ential former non-cooperator as Sartono was certainly a feather in 
Soetardjo1s cap. Apart from Gatot Mangkoepradja,47 however, no other
42. Sinar Deli, May 1, 1937.
43. Soeara Qemoem, December 13, 1937.
44. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1937-38, Vol. I, July 9, 1937, p. 99.
45. Ibid., Zitting 1937-38, Vol. I, August 5, 1937, p. 720.
46. Pemandangan, October 6, 1937.
47. Tempo, August 25, 1936, describes Gatot Mangkoepradja as speaking in support of 
the petition at a Pasoendan meeting.
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prominent former radicals appear to have spoken out in favor of the 
petition. Soetardjo later explained that he had finally yielded to 
,frepeated and strong urges from many sides” to lead a central commit­
tee, because the group established in March could not seem to get off 
the ground. Soetardjo had noted that no one else in the organized 
nationalist movement seemed to be working for the petition, for which 
he felt responsible as one of its initiators.118
The new committee proposed setting up local branches all over the 
Indies to propagandize and to collect signatures for the petition.
Many such sub-committees were founded on the initiative of parties 
which supported the petition, and many, often large, meetings were 
held at which motions were passed in favor of the proposal. Salim and 
Soetardjo were active in publicizing the movement in the Outer Islands. 
The campaign spread also to Holland, where the communist-influenced 
association of Indonesian students, Perhimpoenan Indonesia was backing 
the petition. A committee was formed there in September 1937 to propa­
gandize for the petition, and in March 1938 this group, consisting 
mainly of Perhimpoenan Indonesia and SDAP (Sociaal-Democratische 
Arbeiders Partij--Social-Democratic Workers1 Party) members, sent an 
open letter to all members of the Lower House, drawing attention to 
the great public interest evinced in the petition in the Indies.48 9
In the new Dutch cabinet, formed in June 1937, the Roman Catholic 
Welter replaced Colijn as Minister for Colonies. To most nationalists 
this seemed bound to be an improvement, since they had met no one as 
unsympathetic to their requests as Colijn. Besides, the new minister 
was a member of the RKSP (Rooms-Katholieke Staats-Partij--Roman Catho­
lic State Party) which was generally more liberal than Colijn?s Anti- 
Revolutionnaire Partij. Pemandangan greeted the new cabinet hopefully, 
hailing Welter as an ’’ethically-inclined liberal.” Soeara Oemoem also 
regarded Welter as an improvement on Colijn.50 At any slight bend in 
the road, the cooperating nationalists were inclined to glimpse better 
prospects, being unable to imagine anything worse than the miles they 
had already traversed.
In the Indies, however, the Soetardjo Petition campaign ran into 
considerable difficulties. For one thing, the collection of signatures 
proved a failure. Unused to this form of political action, and no 
doubt afraid of committing themselves to paper, people failed to sign. 
One case brought up by Soetardjo in the Volksraad showed they had 
reason to fear.51 A oontroleur in Palembang had, according to Soetar­
djo, confiscated lists containing 967 signatures supporting his peti­
tion. Some signatories were questioned and two people fined. An offi­
cial report revealed the way in which an unfamiliar Western concept 
was likely to be transmogrified at the local level in the Indies. It 
appeared from the resident of Palembangfs account that a certain Hadji 
Moh. Sabit was exploiting Ratu Adil or Djojobojo expectations in his 
collection of signatures for the petition. He had told local inhabi­
tants that the petition asked for freedom, or requested the Dutch to
48. See Pemimpin, March 1938, and Soeara Oemoem, December 13, 1937.
49. Pemandangan, September 4, 1937. A copy of the open letter is to be found in 
the Soetardjo Collection.
50. IPO 1937, pp. 439 and 482.
51. For details of the following story, see SA (The Hague), Mailrapport No. 777/39.
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keep their promise to leave the Indies at the end of one hundred years, 
or to hand over the government to another ruler. Sabit also apparently 
stated that he was authorized by the government to collect signatures, 
and gave the impression that those who did not sign would miss out on 
certain advantages in the future. He had therefore been fined and his 
signatures confiscated as being extorted under false pretenses/ This 
confused story, typical of several reported at different times from 
outlying areas, illustrates the sort of difficulty faced by the Soetar- 
djo Petition movement.
Perhaps the hardest blow that the campaign received was the re­
fusal of most Indonesian parties, including the biggest ones, to sup­
port it. It was to be expected that the non-cooperating PSII would 
oppose the petition. In November 1937 the party forbade its members 
to be associated with the Central Soetardjo Petition Committee, one of 
its reasons being, in a spirit of defeatism, that ’’having seen the 
experience of the nationalist movement in British India, it is very 
naive to expect to win dominion status without the force of a well- 
organized popular movement.” Another explanation given was that very 
little could be expected of the Imperial Conference suggested by the 
petition so long as the nationalist movement remained crippled by the 
government.5 2
More unexpected was the lack of support from the cooperating par­
ties Parindra and Gerindo. Two of the Nationale Fractie members who 
voted against the petition in the Volksraad, Soeroso and Wirjopranoto, 
were Parindrists, as were two others, Thamrin and Koesoemo Oetoyo, who 
cast votes in favor. Division of opinion appeared also in the party 
outside the council. In a letter from London, dated December 1936 and 
printed in the Parindra daily, Soeara Oemoem (January 4, 1937), the 
party’s president, Dr. Soetomo, appeared to defend the petition. Com­
menting on the current speculation in England concerning reallocation 
of colonies, he said that it was most necessary to strengthen the 
Indies; this the Dutch could do by fulfilling the ideals of the Indone­
sian nation and also by agreeing to the Soetardjo Petition’s request 
for autonomy. Parindrist publications generally were divided in their 
attitudes. All adopted a pessimistic outlook concerning the fate of 
the petition, but while some attacked Soetardjo, others expressed re­
spect for his effort.52 3 54 Reporting to the party on the petition in May 
1937, Thamrin approved Soetardjo’s proposal to hold a conference, since 
that implied ”an admission that the way of government here should be 
changed, and that Indonesians must be consulted, and it gives an oppor­
tunity for Indonesian representatives to propagandize nationalist 
ideals.” He advocated that the party support the petition on condi­
tion that delegates to the proposed conference were chosen in such a 
way that Indonesian national ideals were heard, and that a propaganda 
action was launched to explain the petition to the common people.51* 
Despite this advice and the obvious support of Drs. Soebroto, the cen­
tral executive of Parindra decided in December 1937 that it would not 
support the petition, although it considered a conference between
52. PSII Press Communiqud, November 29, 1937. This is included in a collection of 
documents relating to his petition in the possession of Soetardjo.
53. See Soeara Parindra, August 1936.
54. This advisory report is included in the Soetardjo collection mentioned in Note 
52.
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representatives of Holland and the Indies to be necessary.55 The 
moderates had lost out.
Gerindo took a similar line. In October 1937 its executive issued 
a manifesto stating that the party had decided to support the petition 
so far as the request for an imperial conference was concerned, but 
this request amounted to nothing because it forbade Gerindo members to 
sit on the Soetardjo Petition committees.56
The apathy of the nationalist movement could be attributed to a 
number of factors. After years of past setbacks, defeatism was an 
understandable reaction, and no doubt many radical-minded nationalists 
could not bear to think that where the organized movement had failed, 
an upstart like Soetardjo could succeed. In general terms, the nation­
alists1 lack of confidence may have been caused by the exclusion of 
Indonesians from the most responsible positions in politics and admin­
istration, and their lack of initiative aggravated by the disappearance 
of many of their best leaders. More particularly, the cooperating 
nationalist movement itself was of very recent origin, and its experi­
ence over the difficult and still lingering Depression years made it 
slow to feel its way in a new situation. Certainly one could not say, 
as Pluvier does, that the Soetardjo Petition, "overtly demonstrating 
the wish to cooperate with the administration and with democratic Dutch 
circles in order to make a united stand against the imminent dangers, 
was a clear expression of the popular movement’s change of front."57 
The petition neither originated from the popular movement nor received 
its clear support. Only a few very small parties and the regionalist 
party Pasoendan joined the movement to publicize the petition.58
The Dutch Response
The Soetardjo Petition had passed through the Volksraad with the 
vote of the IEV which claimed to represent the major part of the Euro­
pean community in the Indies. But what support did the proposal in 
fact receive from the Dutch outside the Volksraad? For the purpose of 
this enquiry, the Dutch can be subdivided into the European population 
in the Indies, the Indies government authorities, and the Dutch in 
Holland, as represented in the States-General and at the government 
level. In their attitudes to the petition, each group was influenced 
by its estimation not only of the merits of the proposal, but also of 
the extent and significance of the general support for the petition. 
Very obvious at all levels was the ease with which the petition was 
dismissed.
Even the European community in the Indies can be further subdi­
vided into the Eurasians, who looked on the petition with some favor,
55. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, December 13, 1937.
56. Pemandangan, October 5, 1937, quoted in IPO 1937, pp. 668-669.
57. J. M. Pluvier, "The Soetardjo Petition," in Journal of the Historical Society, 
University of Malaya, Vol. II (1963-64), p. 52.
58. The groups which supported the Central Soetardjo Petition Committee were Pasoen­
dan, PAI, PPKI, Persatoean Minahasa, Perhimpoenan Peladjar2 Indonesia (Indone­
sian Students Association), Sarekat Ambon, PTI and Pergerakan Penjadar.
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and the generally hostile remainder. Although the IEV had cast their 
votes for the proposal, they were unwilling to proceed further with 
this joint Indonesian-European bid for political reform. Admittedly, 
their newspaper Onze Stem was one of the few European papers which de­
fended the petition. But that the Europeans were no more inclined 
than usual to hobnob with Indonesians was clear from their failure to 
support the public campaign for the petition. Onze Stem stated that 
the IEV had voted for the petition because it was a first step towards 
a Rijksraad. If the propaganda at meetings in support of the petition 
had stressed the aims of a conference and a Rijksraad, continued the 
paper, then the IEV would have participated. MBut these meetings have 
gone to extremes and therefore we have remained aloof.”59 As in other 
colonial countries, a mass movement involving cooperation between Euro 
peans and the indigenous population was found to be impossible.
With very few exceptions, the Soetardjo Petition received a bad 
press amongst the European community in the Indies. The big daily 
papers all expressed their opposition, sometimes in ways offensive to 
Soetardjo. The general consensus was that the proposal was inoppor­
tune and that the Indies were not ripe for autonomy. And as with most 
proposals originating from the Indonesian population, the European 
press then proceeded to ignore the issue. In fact Zentgraaff, the ex­
tremely influential editor of the Java-Bode, did not even deign to men 
tion the petition until June 8, 1938, when he condemned it in passing 
as "dangerous to the state” ; in his view political action outside the 
representative councils should be forbidden. The small group of 
liberal-minded Dutchmen spoke out strongly in defense of the petition. 
Kvitiek en Opbouw, for example, frequently expressed its support, but 
its voice did not carry far.
Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the petition itself in 
the Dutch community, there was nevertheless a definite movement in 
favor of greater autonomy for the Indies. As noted above, during the 
Volksraad debate many Europeans reacted favorably to the suggestion of 
a Rijksraad, which would give the Indies a voice in determining policy 
relating to matters affecting both the colonies and the mother country 
The Depression years had been traumatic ones for the Indies, arousing 
the most conservative Dutchmen to protest against Holland's treatment 
of her colony. Scholarly journals on colonial affairs which carried 
several articles condemning the Soetardjo Petition at the same time 
featured many eloquent demands for the reform of colonial relations, 
especially in the economic field. Two articles by high-ranking former 
Indies government officials are classic statements of the case against 
Holland's Depression policy: "Indie Vraagt Hulp,” by J. J. Schrieke,
and "Hollands Fout in Indie,” by J. W.. Meyer Ranneft.60 Both articles 
emphasized the suffering inflicted on the Indies because of Holland's 
control over its budget and currency. As Meyer Ranneft pointed out, 
"The Indies was the only debtor-country in the world that remained on 
gold and that did not wholly or partly repudiate its debts or in other 
ways reduce the value of its currency.” One of the symptoms of the 
resultant dissatisfaction was the Soetardjo Petition. Even the most 
loyal supporters of the government, stated Meyer Ranneft, expected one 
thing of it: some perspective for themselves and the Indies. The
solution offered by writers of such articles varied. Whereas Schrieke
59. Onze Stem, July 22, 1938.
60. Printed respectively in Indisch Genootschap, Vergadering van 8 Mei, 1936 (The 
Hague, 1936), pp. 55-94, and De Gids (Amsterdam, 1937), pp. 289-326.
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was content to demand a grant of at least 30 million guilders per annum 
from the Netherlands to aid the recovery of the Indies, Meyer Ranneft 
requested autonomy for the Indies government; a new relationship must 
be worked out between it and Holland.
Thus conservative and liberal Europeans in the Indies were momen­
tarily in agreement in pressing for more autonomy for the colony, al­
though they had very different ideas of the form autonomy should take. 
Liberals envisaged an autonomous Indies in which Indonesians would 
rule. Though conservatives like Meyer Ranneft and De Hoog did not 
spell out their view of an autonomous Indies in detail, their support 
for the concept implied that Europeans in the colony would take over 
responsibility for the colony from Europeans in Holland. The home 
government was felt to be too unresponsive to the wishes of Indies 
Europeans: it had been both too lenient to the nationalists and too
harsh in its economic measures.
Faced with this general restlessness, what was the reaction of 
the administration in the Indies? Secret official correspondence shows 
that Dutch officials there were very much aware of the growing demand 
for more autonomy not only among Indonesians but also among Europeans. 
What was most remarkable was the ability of the topmost decision-makers 
to claim that no changes were necessary to lull this unrest. The con­
servative administration in Holland had a vested interest in main­
taining its control over Indies policy; for this reason it resisted 
moves towards autonomy by fellow-conservatives in the colony. On a 
higher plane, conservative administrators in both Holland and the 
Indies genuinely believed that they were following the right path for 
the Indies1 development. No one else could be credited with suffi­
cient objectivity to assume this sacred task.
The reports on the Soetardjo Petition by two officials close to 
events--the Government Delegate for General Affairs to the Volksraad 
(W. G. Peekema) and the Adviser for Native Affairs (E. Gobee)--were 
hard-hitting and sacrcely lent themselves to complacent interpreta­
tion.61 Although Peekema was not impressed by the reception of the 
petition among the public and in the Volksraad, he could see that 
native public opinion was no longer confined to a small minority, but 
was growing, stimulated by events at home and abroad. Significantly, 
in the Volksraad there had been some support for the idea of calling a 
conference, and more for the establishment of a state commission which 
could replace such a conference or prepare for it. Peekema expected 
this to be the first sign of greater demands in the future. He con­
sidered it advisable that these aspirations be channeled while there 
was still time; otherwise concessions would be forced and claims would 
become more radical. Interspersed with this assessment went a strongly 
worded attack on the governments lack of political policy. Peekema 
pointed out that while during the past years the government had given 
economic preoccupations as an excuse for saying nothing about the coun­
try’s political future, this line of reasoning would be outdated with 
the passing of the Depression. The other favorite evasive tactic, the 
argument that the Indies were not ’’ripe” for political advance, was, 
said Peekema, Ma will-o’-the-wisp which lands every deliberation in a 
morass.” The question of when and how autonomy would be reached had
61. These two documents are included in S. L. van der Wal, De Volksraad en de Staat- 
kundige Ontwikkeling van Nederlands-Indie, Vol. II (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 
1965), pp. 222-261.
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to be faced. If the petition were passed by without any perspective 
being opened up for the foreseeable future, the reasonable and moder­
ate attitude of native groups would disappear.
After the down-to-earth realism of these warnings, Peekema’s con­
clusions seemed lame, as Gobee commented in his report. The former 
official suggested that the demand for a conference be rejected on the 
grounds that at least at the moment there was a lack of commonly ac­
cepted basic principles. The preparatory work should be done by a 
State Commission which would propose outlines for the gradual politi­
cal development of the Indies. Gobee did not consider that this went 
far enough. He thought that dissatisfaction was far more widespread 
than Peekema had reported. In his view, the Indonesians who engaged 
in moderate political action were nevertheless sympathetic towards 
extremists who turned more fiercely against the government. He pointed 
to the rising interest in Japan, and stated that people were coming to 
the conclusion that since nothing more could be expected of Holland, 
they could not be worse off under Japanese domination, which at least 
would not discriminate racially against Indonesians. The government 
offered nothing politically to which moderate Indonesians could appeal 
in reply to the leaders of the extremist parties. Gobee suggested 
that the conference should be called, but that its task should be lim­
ited to formulating principles for which the practical content could 
be worked out by a State Commission. In the meantime there should be 
steady Indianization of the administration, as an essential precondi­
tion for autonomy.
A far more conservative report came from the Director of Educa­
tion, A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, who was known to be a strong defender 
of government policy.62 He repeated an argument which he had expounded 
in his book, Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurszorg in Bedevlandsoh-Indie,63 
that further political emancipation at the center in the Indies would 
mean the transfer of power from the Netherlands nation to an oligarchy 
of the more or less educated. He rejected this. Political emancipa­
tion should be only the last result of universal, fully social emanci­
pation. This policy the government was wisely pursuing. Apparently 
the proposers of the Soetardjo Petition had in mind the example of 
British India, where a scheme for the preparation of autonomy was 
being undertaken, but this project De Kat Angelino condemned as purely 
artificial because it disregarded the backwardness of the masses. 
Moreover, he disapproved of the very aim of autonomy, which sounded 
too negative. The goal should be to strengthen the realm and the ties 
between its parts. To this end the formation of a Rijksraad would be 
useful; it should consist of a body of experts advising the Crown on 
imperial matters, and could develop into a form of Imperial Parliament.
A fourth important report to the Governor-General was issued by 
the Council of the Netherlands Indies, the former’s advisory body.64 
Its advice was entirely negative. In the council’s opinion, the peti­
tion conflicted with the constitution and was particularly undesirable 
because it appeared to aim at dominion status, for which the country
62. Ibid., pp. 261-284.
63. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch- 
Indie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929).
64. Van der Wal, De Volksraad, pp. 287-316.
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was not prepared. The council considered that reform at the regional 
levels, which would give increased participation to the broad levels 
of the population, was more important than reform at the center.
An interesting aspect of the official reaction to the Soetardjo 
Petition is the extreme slowness with which it was deliberated at the 
top level, indicating indifference and the absence of any conviction 
that the matter was urgent or important. The Minister of Colonies 
could make no decision on the petition until he had received the rele­
vant reports and advice from the Governor-General. But it was not 
until September 1938 that Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, after 
some prompting from the Minister, finally sent his report. The new 
Governor-General perhaps had the excuse that it took him some time to 
find his feet, but obviously he did not give high priority to the peti­
tion. His report on the matter shows a remarkable ability to ignore 
anything disturbing in the advice he had received.65 Although he began 
by admitting that there was widespread feeling in the Indies that the 
country’s development was outgrowing its constitutional structure, 
that the European population felt that the Dutch government exercised 
too much influence on the conduct of the Indies administration, and 
that the politically-conscious part of the native population wanted 
leadership in its own hands, he then proceeded as if these facts were 
irrelevant to the petition. His conclusions rested heavily on the ad­
vice of the Council of the Indies and of De Kat Angelino. He agreed 
with them that extension of autonomy should occur in the regional 
sphere, as in fact it was occurring (in theory) through the administra­
tive reforms then in progress.66 Even if the government attempted to 
set out a political plan, it would give no satisfaction and would 
merely cause confusion. Calling a conference or commission would give 
the damaging impression that the government was admitting weakness, 
and at the same time it would arouse wild hopes which could only be 
disappointed. The Governor-General clearly thought the petition could 
be rejected with impunity. He pointed to the fact that important 
native organizations disapproved of it, and that it had been greeted 
with indifference. He did not think it worthwhile, as even De Kat 
Angelino had, to offer alternative reforms. In his opinion a Rijks- 
raad, for example, would not be useful, and its composition would 
create problems.
So much for the advice of the Governor-General who the Indonesians 
had hoped would be more liberal than his predecessor, Jhr. de Jonge.
It is worth noting that neither of these men was impressed by the 
political advances made in other colonies during their term of office. 
They both firmly believed that the Americans were trying, for ulterior 
motives, to rid themselves of a responsibility in the Philippines. To 
every Indonesian reference to the Philippines they countered trium­
phantly that the Americans welcomed Philippine independence because 
then Philippine exports to the United States could be taxed, and in­
sisted that the Filipinos themselves did not want independence ("an 
unripe fruit" "of which the people would gladly be delivered," so the 
Government Delegate described it in the Volksraad67) , because they
65. Ibid., pp. 382-390.
66. For a discussion of the decentralization measures of the 1930's, see H. J.
Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule 
in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (August 1966), pp. 589- 
605.
67. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1935-36, Vol. I, July 26, 1935, p. 488.
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would be undefended, a prey to Japanese economic and political expan­
sionism. Far from being shamed by comparison with other colonial 
powers, Dutch self-esteem was merely reinforced. They at least were 
not selfishly shirking their duties; at whatever cost to themselves, 
they would see that the Indies were given a solid basis in economic 
and social well-being before political autonomy was considered.68
On such matters, the Governors - General and their respective Minis­
ters for Colonies were in complete agreement. In February 1937, the 
then Minister for Colonies and subsequently Minister-President (the 
Dutch equivalent of Prime Minister), Dr. Hendrik Colijn, had already 
spoken slightingly of the Soetardjo Petition in a States - General de­
bate.69 Referring to it and to another petition which requested the 
right of enquiry for the Volksraad, he complained: "What concerns me
about both petitions is especially that consciously or unconsciously 
they assume that the emancipation of the Netherlands Indies is the 
primary task." Climbing onto his old hobby-horse, he proclaimed that 
there was no national unity in the Indies and that of much more impor­
tance than dominion-status for the country was the training of the 
separate population groups for "local and regional citizenship, ex­
pressed in participation in and care for their own daily interests." 
Theoretically the Minister was to make no pronouncement on the peti­
tion until he had received the Governor-General1s advice, but official 
and parliamentary opinion was already clear. In both Houses of the 
States-General, only the Social Democrats and the Communists spoke in 
defense of the petition during debates on the Indies budget in 1937. 
Since both of these parties were rendered suspect to the rest of the 
parliament by their past association with revolution, their support 
was unlikely to endear the petition to others. The Communists in par­
ticular were discredited, because in conformity with the Moscow line, 
they had recently made a volte-face and were now currying favor with 
"bourgeois democratic" parties in an attempt to form a united front 
against international fascism. The Indonesian communist, Roestam 
Effendi, presented his party's new colonial policy in the Lower House 
in February 1937:70 the Communists had abandoned their slogan "Indone­
sia free from Holland now!" since Communists would not support inde­
pendence "if it would turn out to the advantage of fascist states."
The Indies, threatened by Japan, should not be independent but rather 
should be strengthened against fascism both militarily and through 
democratic reforms. To this end Effendi supported moderate demands 
like that embodied in the Soetardjo Petition. Other members of the 
House greeted Effendi1s new look with heavy sarcism or mild distrust. 
With such friends, did the petition need enemies?
If supporters of the petition had hoped for a more favorable re­
sponse in 1938 from the newly-elected Lower House and the new Minister 
for Colonies, Welter, they were rapidly disillusioned. From the more 
extensive discussion of the petition in the States-General in February 
and May of 1938, it was clear that opinion there had not changed. 
Welter1s approach to colonial policy was the same as that of Colijn, 
although he had in the past shown signs of apparent inconsistency.
68. Ibid., Zitting 1939-40, Vol. I, July 31, 1939, pp. 546-547.
69. Staten-Generaal, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, February 12, 1937, pp. 1617-18.
70. Ibid., February 10, 1937, pp. 1552-55.
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For example, a public speech made by him in 1936 on "Holland’s Task in 
the Netherlands Indies" seemed to indicate that Welter was aware of 
the stirrings of momentous changes in the Indies and that he thought 
they should not be resisted face on.71 Certainly Soetardjo referred 
to this speech with hopeful approval when introducing his petition to 
the Volksraad.72 734 To judge from Welter’s previous and subsequent per­
formance, however, it would appear that this address was either mis­
leadingly meaningless or an aberration. In his pronouncements as 
Minister, Welter expressed opposition to change and general satisfac­
tion with the status quo in the Indies. In the States-General in 1938 
he supported Colijn’s stand that political reform must henceforth pro­
ceed at the local level. According to him, Dutch colonial policy was 
geared to the masses, not to the movement of the Western-educated, 
alienated nationalists.
A great French publicist once said, the task of government is not to 
hear the voices of those who speak, but to listen to those who do not 
speak. In the course of many years the Indies Government has learned 
this art, and if I listen I hear that those tens of millions really 
only want to be able to work their plot of land peacefully, to pluck 
its sober fruits and to live peacefully with their wives and chil- 
dren.73
While still maintaining the fiction that he was suspending judgment on 
the Soetardjo Petition until he had heard from the Governor-General, 
Welter rejected any idea of autonomy for the Indies. Being so emi­
nently quotable, he must be cited again:
Who that is aware of the beneficial work which the Dutch people have 
done in the Indies and also of the wholesome influence which the 
Dutch Parliament has on the course of events in the Indies, would 
now wish to make an end to that situation? I believe that to pose 
the question is at the same time to answer it.7*
In his view, it was not time to consider new political reforms at the 
center, since the 1925 reform had not yet been digested. In answer to 
"natives who strive for political development," he recommended that 
they work with the Dutch authorities for the spiritual and material 
development of their people. This was the only way to political ad­
vancement- -not by means of the conference table. He concluded by ex­
pressing his pleasure "that this idea is increasingly catching on in 
native circles."
To judge from the remarks of members of the States-General, Stark- 
enborgh, Welter and Colijn were fairly representative of Dutch colonial 
thinking of the time. The 1937 election had brought little change in 
the composition of the Lower House. The Roman Catholics and Anti- 
Revolutionaries had gained slightly at the expense of the Liberals and 
the Christelijk-Historische Unie [Christian Historical Union--CHU], 
and the ruling confessional parties' coalition maintained a clear
71. A report of this speech is given in De Indische Gids, 1936, pp. 841-843.
72. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1936-37, Vol. I, July 9, 1936, p. 76.
73. Staten-Generaal, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, March 1, 1938, p. 1257.
74. Ibid., p. 1260. The same reference applies to the rest of this paragraph.
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majority over the Liberals, Social Democrats and Communists. The non­
confessional parties were more favorably disposed towards Indonesian 
autonomy than the others, and in this situation the Roman Catholics, 
with almost a third of the Lower House seats, occupied a crucial posi­
tion. The RKSP contained a mixture of people, ranging from almost 
socialist-minded members to old-style conservatives like Welter. But 
on the subject of the Soetardjo Petition, Roman Catholics stood behind 
their Minister. A conservative Catholic member, Bajetto, commended the 
Minister for his negative attitude towards the petition. "To those 
who are inclined to see a solution to political problems in submission 
to nationalist aspirations, I wish to point to the lessons of history, 
which . . . always prove that this only leads to the posing of intensi­
fied demands," an example being British India.75
Apart from the leftists, only a very few speakers like A. M. Joekes 
of the Liberal Democrats and B. C. de Savornin Lohman of the CHU ap­
peared to think it necessary to consider any new political reforms. 
Joekes asked why the Indies could not settle its own budget without the 
need for approval from the States - General.76 As we have seen above, 
Welter thought the influence of the Dutch Parliament a beneficial one. 
De Savornin Lohman favored a Rijksraad as De Kat Angelino envisaged 
it,77 but the Minister dismissed this out of hand as unnecessary--he 
already had enough advisory bodies.78 In Dutch society outside the 
States-General there was scarcely a glimmer of interest in reform in 
the Indies, except among the leftists.
In November 1938 the Royal Decree on the Soetardjo Petition was 
finally sent out to the Volksraad.79 It rejected the petition on sev­
eral grounds. Article 1 of the constitution could give no support to 
Soetardjo*s request because it "gave no indication of the state of 
autonomy of the Netherlands Indies." The Dutch policy towards the In­
dies was to increase the control of its inhabitants over internal mat­
ters, and according to this principle a number of important reforms had 
been promulgated within a short period. Existing constitutional and 
legal provisions offered room for further advance. But political au­
tonomy must grow as "the naturally ripening fruit" of the social and 
economic development of the country; otherwise it was "artificial."
Like the Governor-General, the Minister had ignored any stirrings of 
unrest in the Indies, both because he believed them insignificant, and 
because to acknowledge them "could be seen as a sign of weakness."80 
The final decision yielded not an inch, not even, as Peekema had urged, 
to open up any perspectives.
75. Ibid., February 24, 1938, p. 1219.
76. Ibid., February 25, 1938, p. 1236.
77. Handelingen van de Eerste Kamer, May 19, 1938, p. 708.
78. Ibid., May 20, 1938, p. 723.
79. The decree is included in Van der Wal, De Volksraad, Vol. II, pp. 394-396.
80. Quoted from a communique to the Queen from the Minister, November 8, 1938, in 
ibid., p. 392.
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Reactions to the Rejection of the Petition
As the Dutch decision-makers had predicted, little outward inter­
est was aroused by the fate of the Soetardjo Petition. Most observers 
seem to have regarded its rejection as a foregone conclusion, and it 
received little attention in the Volksraad after 1936. At the opening 
of the 1937 and 1938 sessions, Soetardjo spoke with a mixture of hope 
and bitterness about the future of his proposal, with bitterness rapid­
ly gaining the upper hand. Since it was clear at an early stage that 
the States - General and the Minister opposed the petition, his speeches 
each year were almost the same as when the final blow fell. He 
stressed increasingly the discredit into which the Volksraad was fall­
ing, the international threat of war81 and the dangerously widening 
gulf between Dutch and Indonesians. The members of the Nationale 
Fractie hardly deigned to mention the petition, but they made their 
opinion clear by speaking in Malay during the 1938 session--a demon­
stration which caused indignant flutterings in official dovecotes.82 
The European members had similarly long given the petition up for lost, 
but that they, too, were not altogether happy at its failure to influ­
ence the authorities in any way was shown by their continued advocacy 
of some sort of reform in colonial relations. However, receiving no 
encouragement from either the Indonesians or the government, they 
failed to formulate any concrete proposals.
The moderate, non-organized nationalists in the Volksraad had made 
their bid to do something which had not been attempted since the Radi­
cal Concentration of 1922: to unite discontented Europeans and Indone­
sian members in an attempt to force a reform in imperial relations.
The opportunity was there to push home the point that a large and grow­
ing majority of Volksraad members wanted more autonomy for the Indies. 
If it had had more unanimity in the Volksraad, to which a stronger 
backing by the Nationale Fractie would have contributed, the petition 
might have made more impact on the decision-makers. Perhaps nothing 
would have deflected the course of Dutch colonial policy in these 
years, but it seems likely that if any political development in the 
Indies could have done so, it would have been combined European and 
Indonesian pressure for gradual political reforms through the Volks­
raad, rather than extreme demands by a small isolated group of nation­
alists. At the time, the organized cooperating nationalists rejected 
this parliamentary path and, debarred from or neglecting other alter­
native paths, they clung tc the radical tradition sanctified by the 
non-cooperators.
Surprisingly, however, the failure of Soetardjo1s initiative did 
not give rise to greater gloom and inactivity among nationalists. In 
many ways the petition had a catalytic effect on the nationalist move­
ment, helping to stir the organized nationalists out of the apathetic 
defeatism in which they had been languishing since the non-cooperating 
movement had been paralyzed. As Pemandangan remarked in December 1938,
81. To exert last-minute pressure, he directed a question to the government in 
October 1938, suggesting that his proposed conference should issue a statement 
that the population of the Indies wished to retain its connection with Holland. 
The question was prompted by current rumors that the Indies would be divided up 
among other powers.
82. See Van der Wal, De Volksraad, Vol. II, pp. 369-377.
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although the petition had been rejected, that did not mean it was 
valueless. The petition had appeared at a time when the popular move­
ment was weak, and the public discussion it aroused stirred the move­
ment into action.83 84 The cooperation of parties on the Central Soetar- 
djo Petition Committee had given a boost to organizational development. 
In July 1939 Soetardjo pointed to the validation of his earlier predic­
tion that in case of the failure of his petition, "Mr. Thamrin would 
be called upon to speak."81* For by that time Gapi, embracing almost 
all nationalist parties, had been founded. It had followed directly 
after the dissolution of the Soetardjo Petition Committee in May 1939. 
Perhaps, as one commentator put it, the rejection of the petition was 
more important than the petition itself.85
Admittedly, this new turn of events could not be attributed en­
tirely to the petition. A more obvious improvement in the general 
economic situation at this date may have had something to do with it. 
Hope arising from the tense international situation from 1938 onwards 
was also a driving force behind the new unity. The nationalists hoped 
that the threat of war would cause the Dutch to seek a rapprochement 
with them.
Despite the outright rejection of Soetardjo!s methods by radical 
nationalists, the organized nationalist movement did not simply swing 
back to the old solution of rallying the forces in the face of opposi­
tion. The Nationale Fractie began to make more constructive use of the 
Volksraad by introducing motions aimed at democratization. For in­
stance, Wiwoho, who had voted against the Soetardjo Petition, intro­
duced a proposal on very similar lines in 1940. More generally, the 
petition had made a significant contribution to the nationalist move­
ment, in that it encouraged piecemeal advances rather than vague de­
mands for independence. Gapi adopted the immediate aim of a parliament 
for Indonesia, and devoted its full resources to campaigning for this 
obj ective.
What of the effect of the rejection of the petition on its pro­
posers? We have already referred to Ratu Langie!s assumption of the 
editorship of the nationalist weekly Rationale Commentaren from 1938 
onwards. Doubtless the failure of the petition which he had co-spon­
sored helped increase his identification with the organized nationalist 
movement, into which he steered his party when it joined Gapi in 1939.
This was also the fate of Kasimo's PPKI and the PAI to which Ala- 
tas belonged. Thus three of the signatories of the petition moved from 
positions outside the organized nationalist movement to take up a com­
mitment to a wider, more radical goal within it. As for PPBB members 
in the Volksraad, in 1941 Soetardjo led them to assume a position com­
mitted to nationalist goals; in July of that year they formed them­
selves into a "Middle Group" aiming at autonomy for the Indies within 
the terms of article 1 of the constitution.86 Naturally the extent of
83. Quoted in IPO 1938, p. 824.
84. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1938-39, Vol. I, July 10, 1939, p. 35.
85. M. Natsir in Pandji Islam, December, 1938. (Cited in Natsir, Capita Selecta, 
Vol. I [Bandung/The Hague: van Hoeve, 1955], pp. 236-237.)
86. Handelingen van de Volksraad, Zitting 1940-41, Vol. I, July 15, 1941, p. 208.
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the contribution of the petition's rejection to the increasingly public 
commitment by its signatories to nationalism is debatable, but it must 
have been an important factor.
While officials closest to events in the Indies grew increasingly 
uneasy at the estrangement of Indonesians from Dutch rule and at the 
dissatisfaction evinced by many Europeans there, the Dutch in Holland 
and their top decision-makers were not to be impressed by proffered 
umbrellas: they refused to believe it was going to rain until the
storm was upon them. But even if the Soetardjo Petition failed to 
achieve its goal, it had the useful outcome of helping to unify and 
increase the effectiveness of the nationalist movement. Introduced by 
moderate nationalists whom its rejection helped to radicalize, the 
petition taught a lesson in gradualism to the organized nationalist 
movement.
